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DistinctFrontoparietalNetworksSet theStage forLaterPerceptual
Identification Priming and Episodic Recognition Memory
MariaWimber, Hans-Jochen Heinze, and Alan Richardson-Klavehn
Department of Neurology, University of Magdeburg, 39120 Magdeburg, Germany
Recent imaging evidence suggests that a network of brain regions including the medial temporal lobe, ventrolateral prefrontal
cortex, and dorsal posterior parietal cortex supports the successful encoding of long-term memories. Other areas, like the ventral
posterior parietal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices, have been associated with encoding failure rather than success. In line with
the transfer-appropriate processing view, we hypothesized that distinct neural networks predict successful encoding depending on
whether the later memory test draws primarily on perceptual or conceptual memory representations. Following an encoding
phase, memory was assessed in a combined incidental perceptual identification and intentional recognition memory test. We
found that during encoding, activation in ventral posterior parietal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex predicted successful per-
ceptual identification priming, whereas activation in ventrolateral prefrontal and dorsal posterior parietal cortex predicted
successful recognitionmemory. Extending recent theories of attention to memory, the results suggest that ventral parietal regions
support stimulus-driven attention to perceptual item features, forming memories accessed by later perceptual memory tests,
whereas dorsal parietal regions support attention to meaningful item features, forming memories accessed by later conceptual
memory tests.
Introduction
Functional neuroimaging research has now uncovered a network
of brain regions that appears crucial for the successful formation
of new long-term memories (Blumenfeld and Ranganath, 2007;
Uncapher andWagner, 2009), which includes themedial tempo-
ral lobes, left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC), and dorsal
posterior parietal cortex (PPC). These areas typically show so
called “difference due to latermemory” (DM) effects (Paller et al.,
1987), that is, increased activation at encoding is associated with
an increased likelihood that information will be later remem-
bered. Other brain areas show reverse DM effects, with increased
activation at encoding being associated with a decreased likeli-
hood that information will be later remembered (Otten and
Rugg, 2001a; Daselaar et al., 2004; Shrager et al., 2008).
Similar DM effects have been reported under a number of
different encoding conditions (Otten and Rugg, 2001b; Otten et
al., 2001), but little attention has been paid to the role of the later
memory test, with most studies using recognition memory tests
(Otten and Rugg, 2001a,b; Otten et al., 2001, 2002). Cognitive
theory, in contrast, has long appreciated the strong interactions
between encoding and retrieval processes. According to transfer-
appropriate processing theory (Morris et al., 1977), memory per-
formance depends on the degree of overlap between cognitive
operations at encoding and at retrieval. Recognition tests are in-
tentional memory tests that typically benefit from attending to
conceptual aspects of items at encoding; by contrast, tests of per-
ceptual identification priming are incidental memory tests that
typically benefit from attending to perceptual features of items at
encoding (Jacoby, 1983; Richardson-Klavehn et al., 1994b) [for
review, see Roediger and McDermott (1993) and Richardson-
Klavehn et al. (2009)]. Thus, there is no good or bad encoding,
because successful memory formation depends on whether the
aspects of an item attended to at encoding are relevant for the
later test. Brain areas showing reverse DM effects for later
intentional-conceptual memory might, therefore, actually show
positive DM effects for later incidental-perceptual memory.
Recent neurocognitive theorizing has focused on the role of
attentional processes supported by posterior parietal cortex for
long-termmemory encoding and retrieval (Cabeza, 2008; Cabeza
et al., 2008; Ciaramelli et al., 2008). Interestingly, the majority of
positive DM effects have included dorsal posterior parietal areas
that support controlled, goal-directed attention (Corbetta and
Shulman, 2002; Cabeza, 2008; Uncapher and Wagner, 2009). By
contrast, negative DM effects have exclusively been found in ven-
tral parietal areas that have been associated with perceptually
driven attentional capture (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Uncapher
and Wagner, 2009), raising the interesting hypothesis that these
brain areas might show positive DM effects if the later test draws
primarily on perceptual rather than conceptual memory repre-
sentations. We tested this hypothesis in the current experiment.
Participants underwent fMRI scanning while encoding verbal
material, followed by a two-stage testing procedure that assessed
both incidental perceptual identification priming and intentional
recognition memory.
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Materials andMethods
Participants. Twenty-three right-handed, healthy volunteers (10 male;
mean age, 25.0 years; age range, 20–35 years) were paid to participate in
the experiment after giving their written informed consent. The experi-
ment was conducted in accordance with the guidelines of the ethics
committee of the University of Magdeburg Medical Faculty. Three par-
ticipants were excluded from data analysis, one because of a technical
problem with response recording, and two because of too few correct
word identifications. An additional nine healthy volunteers participated
in a further purely behavioral experiment (see below for details).
Materials.Materials were 540Germanwords drawn from a larger pool
that has been successfully used in prior memory studies (Schott et al.,
2005, 2006). These 540 words were separated into three lists with 180
words each, matched formean word frequency (according to the CELEX
database) and word length. Assignment of list to scanning session was
counterbalanced across participants, as was assignment of the words as
studied or nonstudied.
Behavioral procedure. The experiment consisted of three scanning ses-
sions, each comprising one full study–test cycle, with a short break be-
tween sessions (Fig. 1). In the study phase, 120 words were encoded in a
syllable counting task. Study trials consisted of a fixation cross presented
for 700 ms, followed by a word for 800 ms, followed by an asterisk for
1000ms, the latter cuing participants to indicate via button presswhether
the word contained exactly two or any other number of syllables. Every
10th study trial was followed by a 16 s fixation period. Participants were
instructed to perform the syllable counting as accurately as possible, and
not to memorize the items. However, they were informed about the
upcoming test phase before entering the scanner, so it cannot be ruled
out that some participants tried to memorize the study items.
During the subsequent perceptual identification/recognitionmemory
test, the 120 studied words were randomly intermixed with 60 new,
nonstudied, words. Test trials startedwith 500ms of fixation, followed by
a word that was briefly flashed for 33–66 ms (adapted for individual
thresholds in a training session; see below), followed by a mask
(“XXXXX”) for 944–967ms, an asterisk for 2000ms, and three exclama-
tion marks for 1000 ms. Participants were asked to concentrate on iden-
tifying the word, and upon presentation of the asterisk, to indicate via a
button press whether they could identify the word and thought it was on
the prior list (index finger), could identify the word but thought that it
was new (middle finger), or were not able to identify the word at all (ring
finger). The three exclamation marks prompted participants to say out
loud the word they had identified, or respond with “weiter” (German for
“pass”) in case they had not been able to identify theword. As in the study
phase, a 16 s fixation period followed every 10th trial. Based on partici-
pants’ test performance, study trials were sorted post hoc into later-
remembered items (R; words that were later identified and correctly
recognized as studied), later-primed items (P; words that were later iden-
tified but not recognized as studied), and later-nonidentified items
(nonID; words that later elicited no identification response, or were in-
correctly identified as other words). This classification allowed us to
isolate neural processes at encoding specific for later recognition mem-
ory by comparing later-remembered with later-primed words, and neu-
ral processes at encoding specific for later perceptual identification
priming, uncontaminated by neural processes at encoding specific for
later recognition memory, by comparing later-primed and later-
nonidentified words (see Schott et al., 2005, 2006; Voss and Paller, 2008).
With this procedure, studied/nonstudied judgments, resulting in classi-
fication into the R and P item categories, could only be made on items
that were successfully identified. Thus, there was no category of “forgot-
ten” items comparable to prior studies on recognition DM effects. In-
stead, there were studied items later forgotten due to recognition
memory failure, but nonetheless successfully identified (P items), and
studied items later “forgotten” due to unsuccessful identification (nonID
items). We were unable to determine which of the nonID items would
have been remembered and forgotten had these items been presented in
a standard recognition test.
Preexperimental training. Before entering the scanner, participants
completed up to three short practice sessions tomake them familiar with
the general procedure, and to determine their individual perceptual
thresholds. A practice session was a short version of a study–test cycle
with only 12 study words and 18 test words (12 studied, 6 nonstudied),
using the same timing parameters as later during scanning. During the
first practice session, words in the perceptual identification test were
masked after 66 ms. If a participant was able to identify 50% of the
nonstudied words, presentation duration was lowered to 50 ms in a
second practice session and, if the participant still identified50%of the
nonstudied items in that session, further lowered to 33 ms in a third
practice session. Thus, one, two, or three practice sessions were con-
ducted, depending on the presentation duration at which performance
on nonstudied words dropped to 50%. Presentation duration deter-
mined this way was used in the first scanning session, with the possibility
to adjust them up or down in case a participant performed at floor or
ceiling during scanning (whichwas the case in only twoparticipants, with
presentation duration lowered from 66 to 50ms after the first run in one
case, and raised from 33 to 50 ms in the other case).
Behavioral experiment. To clarify the basis of recognition memory
(studied vs nonstudied) judgments during the fMRI experiment, nine
additional healthy participants (six female, mean age 22.1 years, range
20–27 years) were paid to participate in a purely behavioral experiment
using the same perceptual identification/recognition memory test as in
the fMRI experiment. Participants completed three runs with 180 words
(120 targets, 60 distracters) each. The runs differed in the recognition
memory judgment required after perceptual identification, resulting
in three within-participants test conditions (OLD/NEW vs R/K/G vs
CONF). Order of test condition was counterbalanced using a balanced
Latin square, with each test condition being undertaken first, second, and
third equally often across participants (three participants per order of
tests). The procedure in all three test conditions closely paralleled the one
used in the fMRI experiment. Preexperimental training and determina-
tion of presentation duration took place before the three study–test runs,
and resembled that for the fMRI experiment, except that participants
always received three practice sessions, onewith each of the three kinds of
test instructions. Study phases did not differ from those in the fMRI
experiment, with the exception that there were no resting baseline peri-
ods in the behavioral experiment. Test trials always startedwith 500ms of
fixation, followed by an item presented for 33–66 ms, directly followed
by a mask for 1944–1977 ms. Participants were asked to give a verbal
response while the mask was still on the screen, and to name the word if
they were able to identify it, or to respond with “weiter” (German for
“pass”) if they were not able to identify the item.
The three test conditions differed only in the type of memory judg-
ment participants had to give after the oral response. In the OLD/NEW
condition, as in the fMRI experiment, themaskwas followed by the digits
1 and 2 presented for 2000ms, cuing participants to press the “1” button
on the numeric pad of the keyboard if they thought that the item that they
had just identified was studied, and the “2” button if they thought that
the item was nonstudied. In the R/K/G condition, a studied/nonstudied
judgment was given first (1 studied, 2 nonstudied), but each “stud-
ied” response was then followed by the digits 1 to 3 for another 1500 ms,
and participants indicated via button press whether their “studied” judg-
ment was based on conscious recollection of the contextual details of the
Figure1. Experimental procedure,with stimulus durations. Participants encodedwords in a
syllable judgment task. A perceptual identification/recognition memory test followed, during
which they had to identify briefly presented, masked words, and to judge identified words as
studied or nonstudied. Based on test performance,words presented at encodingwere classified
as later identified and judged as studied (remembered: R), later identified and judged as non-
studied (primed: P), or later nonidentified (nonID).
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study episode (“1,” Recollect), a strong feeling of familiarity with the
word within the experimental context (“2,” Know), or simple guessing
(“3,” Guess). Recollect, Know, and Guess judgments were made follow-
ing the studied/nonstudied judgment (i.e., only for words judged stud-
ied) because of a risk that participants treat these responses similarly to
confidence ratings when asked to simultaneously make Recollect, Know,
Guess, and Nonstudied judgments. The judgments are, by contrast, sup-
posed to index qualitatively different states of memory awareness during
recognition memory, and they provide different information about the
subjective basis of recognition than do confidence judgments. For a de-
tailed description and discussion of these test instructions, and relevant
data, see Gardiner and Richardson-Klavehn (2000). Note that Recollect
judgments are normally termed Remember judgments (Gardiner and
Richardson-Klavehn, 2000), but that we adapt the terminology here to
avoid confusionwith the later-remembered (R) category of items that we
use for interpretation of the fMRI data. In the CONF condition, themask
was directly followed by a screen showing the digits 1 to 6 (presented for
2000 ms), prompting subjects to rate their confidence that an item
was studied on a scale from C1 (“very sure studied”) to C6 (“very sure
nonstudied”), with the responses C3 and C4 representing “tenden-
tially studied” and “tendentially nonstudied,” respectively. The addi-
tional behavioral experiment permitted us to test whether the relative
percentages of R and P items observed in the fMRI experiment varied
as a function of the recognition memory test instructions, and thus to
assess empirically whether the P items in the fMRI experiment may
have been “contaminated” by familiarity or by low-confidence recog-
nition memory.
fMRI data acquisition and analysis. Full-brain functional images were
collected on a Siemens Trio 3T scanner, using an interleaved, T2*-
weighted echo-planar image (EPI) sequence sensitive to blood oxygen-
ation level-dependent (BOLD) contrast (repetition time  2.0 s; echo
time 35ms). Functional volumes consisted of 32 slices (3.5 mm thick-
ness) with an in-plane resolution of 3.5  3.5 mm. High resolution
T1-weighted structural images were acquired from each participant be-
fore the actual experiment started. Imaging data were preprocessed and
statistically analyzed using statistical parametric mapping (SPM5, Well-
come Department of Cognitive Neurology, London, UK: www.fil.ion.
ucl.ac.uk/spm/). After discarding the first five images of each session,
time series were corrected for differences in slice acquisition time, un-
warped, and spatially realigned to the first image of the first session.
Structural images were coregistered with themean functional image, and
were then normalized to a MNI (Montreal Neurological Institute, www.
mni.mcgill.ca) template in standard stereotactic space using the SPM5
segmentation algorithm. Resulting normalization parameters were ap-
plied to all functional images, whichwere finally smoothedwith an 8mm
FWHMGaussian kernel.
Statistical analyses were conducted in two steps. On a single-subject
level, hemodynamic responses were modeled by convolving an onset
vector containing delta stick or boxcar functions at the onset of a
word or fixation period, respectively, with a first-order canonical
hemodynamic response function (Friston et al., 1994). Resulting time
series were then used as regressors in a voxelwise, fixed effects general
linear model, treating slow signal components (256 s) as confounds.
Study phase data were modeled by three event-related covariates for
R, P, and nonID items, a covariate capturing motor responses, and a
blocked covariate for the 16 s fixation periods. Session-specific effects
and movement parameters determined during realignment were in-
cluded in the model. For the above mentioned planned comparisons,
participants’ statistical parametric maps of intentional-conceptual
(R  P) and incidental-perceptual (P  nonID) DM effects were
tested with one-sample t tests against the null hypothesis of zero mean
difference ( p  0.001, uncorrected for multiple comparisons, mini-
mum 5 adjacent voxels).
Results
Behavioral data
At study, participants performed the syllable counting task at
94.2 0.8% (SEM) correct, and a one-way ANOVA showed that
the percentage of correct responses was not significantly related
to item type (later R: 94.6 0.8%, later P: 94.0 1.2%, and later
nonID: 94.8 0.8%; F(2,38) 1.04, p 0.36). Likewise, reaction
times (RTs) at study were not significantly related to item type
(later R: 1142  36 ms, later P: 1144  35 ms, and later nonID:
1159  40 ms; F(2,38)  0.06, p  0.95). Thus, performance
differences at study do not complicate interpretation of the fMRI
data from the study phase presented here, although it should be
noted that participants had to withhold their responses until 800
ms after stimulus onset, whichmay have biased RTs toward being
similar across item types.
Performance during the combined perceptual identification/
recognition memory test in the fMRI experiment is summarized
in Table 1, together with the data from the additional behavioral
experiment. In the fMRI experiment, we found significant per-
ceptual identification priming for studied compared with non-
studied words, such that participants correctly identified a higher
percentage of studied words (71.9  3.5%) than nonstudied
words (53.2 4.0%; t(19) 18.85, p 0.05). Correctly identified
studiedwords fell into approximately equal percentages thatwere
judged studied (R items) and judged nonstudied (P items). RTs
during the test phase are shown in supplemental Table 1 (avail-
able at www.jneurosci.org as supplemental material). Note that
participants were asked not to press the button until 1000 ms
after stimulus onset. A one-way ANOVA revealed that there was
a significant RT difference between item types (F(2,38)  6.17,
p  0.05), with significantly faster responses to R than P items
(t(19) 2.72, p 0.05), to R than nonID items (t(19) 8.25, p
0.05), and to P than nonID items (t(19) 4.23, p 0.05). The RT
data at test thus show that both recognition memory success
and perceptual identification success were associated with
faster responses.
fMRI data
DM effects for recognition memory (Fig. 2A, green; Table 2),
that is, activation differences during the encoding of later-
remembered compared with later-primed items (R P), were
found bilaterally in the middle temporal gyrus (BA 20/21/37),
inferior and middle frontal gyri (BA 46 and 47), superior and
Table 1. Behavioral performance in the combined perceptual identification/
recognition test in the fMRI experiment and the behavioral experiment
R P NonID
FMRI experiment
Studied words 35.2 (3.6) 36.7 (3.6) 26.9 (3.3)
Nonstudied words 7.7 (1.6) 45.5 (4.1) 45.0 (3.8)
Behavioral experiment: OLD/NEW condition
Studied words 37.7 (6.8) 33.7 (4.9) 26.7 (4.3)
Nonstudied words 11.8 (2.7) 43.0 (6.2) 41.9 (4.9)
Behavioral experiment: R/K/G condition
Studied words 31.4 (6.3) 33.7 (3.7) 33.2 (5.1)
Nonstudied words 8.5 (1.6) 40.6 (5.4) 46.1 (3.8)
Behavioral experiment: CONF condition
Studied words 40.0 (6.3) 32.7 (2.2) 24.3 (4.6)
Nonstudied words 10.2 (2.0) 48.7 (4.8) 37.2 (3.7)
Data are mean percentages (with SEM) of items correctly identified and judged studied (R or remembered items),
correctly identified and judged nonstudied (P or primed items), and nonidentified (nonID items). For studiedwords,
the R and P categories correspond to recognitionmemory hits andmisses, respectively. For nonstudiedwords, the R
and P categories correspond to recognition memory false alarms and correct rejections, respectively. Data from the
behavioral experiment are from a test condition replicating the fMRI experiment (OLD/NEW condition), a test
condition in which participants classified items judged studied as being specifically recollected as studied (Recol-
lect), familiar in the experimental context (Know), or guessed as studied (Guess) (R/K/G condition), and from a test
condition in which participants rated their confidence that items were studied on a six-point scale (C1 very sure
studied; C6  very sure nonstudied) (CONF condition). As shown here, items receiving responses C1-C3 were
classified as judged studied (R items), and items receiving responses C4-C6 were classified as judged nonstudied (P
items). See supplemental Tables 3 and4 (available atwww.jneurosci.org as supplementalmaterial) for distributions
of Recollect/Know/Guess and confidence judgments.
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inferior parietal lobule (BA 7 and BA 40, respectively), medial
and lateral premotor areas (BA 6), hippocampus, and fusiform
gyrus (BA 20/37). The major DM effects for perceptual iden-
tification priming (P  nonID) (Fig. 2A, blue; Table 3) were
located bilaterally in more ventral (BA 39 and 40) and medial
(BA 31) portions of the parietal lobe, including supramarginal
and angular gyrus, as well as posterior areas around the tem-
poroparietal junction, in posterior and dorsal aspects of the
middle and superior frontal gyri (BA 6/8/9/10), and in bilat-
eral middle and inferior temporal gyri (BA 20/21).
Figure2. Encoding activations that predictedwhether an itemwas later perceptually identified and judged studied (remembered: R), perceptually identified and judgednonstudied (primed: P),
or not identified (nonID). A, Dorsal posterior parietal and ventral prefrontal regions showed DM effects for recognition memory (green), whereas ventral posterior parietal and dorsal prefrontal
regions showed DM effects for perceptual identification priming (blue). Bar plots showmean eigenvalues from dorsal and ventral posterior PPC (ROIs defined from an independent half of the data,
see Results). B, Medial temporal clusters that predicted later recognitionmemory (green) and perceptual identification (blue) are depicted on a coronal section ( y27) of anMNI canonical T1
template in neurological orientation.
Table 2. Regions showing DM effects for recognitionmemory (shown in green in Fig. 2), that is, significantly more activation ( p< 0.001 uncorrected, cluster size>5
voxels) during the encoding of later-remembered (R) than later-primed (P) words
Hemisphere Anatomical label x y z BA T Size
L Middle temporal gyrus 51 42 12 20 7.40 242
Middle temporal gyrus 57 42 6 37 6.93
Middle temporal gyrus 63 51 3 21 4.87
R Inferior frontal gyrus 48 33 9 46 6.91 235
Inferior frontal gyrus 54 42 12 46 6.68
Middle frontal gyrus 39 39 3 47 5.21
L Inferior frontal gyrus 45 30 6 46 6.16 564
Middle frontal gyrus 42 18 21 46 5.87
Middle frontal gyrus 57 24 24 46 5.64
R Middle temporal gyrus 63 45 9 21 5.63 85
Middle temporal gyrus 60 45 0 21 4.89
Inferior temporal gyrus 57 33 15 20 4.59
L Fusiform gyrus 42 30 15 20 5.25 13
L Inferior parietal lobule 42 54 51 40 5.22 111
R Superior parietal lobule 30 69 51 7 4.93 71
Superior parietal lobule 33 63 45 7 4.45
Middle temporal gyrus 39 66 27 39 3.58
R Inferior parietal lobule 39 45 39 40 4.79 45
Superior parietal lobule 33 48 48 7 4.33
Inferior parietal lobule 48 42 48 40 3.84
L Precuneus 15 81 42 19 4.54 21
B Medial frontal gyrus 3 24 57 6 4.49 18
Medial frontal gyrus 12 24 57 6 4.30
L Hippocampus 36 20 15 — 4.43 11
R Precentral gyrus 45 0 30 6 4.12 7
L Superior parietal lobule 27 42 48 40 3.92 5
R Fusiform gyrus 45 51 15 37 3.84 13
Rowswithentries forhemisphereandsize refer topeakactivations inacluster. L, Left hemisphere; R, right hemisphere; B, bilateral; BA, approximateBrodmannarea labeled according to the TalairachDaemon; size, cluster size in voxels (333mm).
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In the light of recent claims of a role for the posterior parietal
lobe in memory encoding (see Introduction and Discussion), we
were particularly interested in the functional dissociation be-
tween ventral and dorsal posterior parietal lobe that was apparent
in the present data. To underpin the claim of a true double dis-
sociation, we ran an additional split-half analysis to be able to
define regions of interest (ROIs) on one half of the data from each
participant, and to then test for an interaction on the second,
unbiased half. The onset vectors of the three item types at encod-
ing were randomly split into two halves (with the restriction that
the same number of onsets were picked from each quarter of the
original vector), and new first-level (single-subject) models were
estimated, now containing six instead of the original three covari-
ates of interest (R1, R2, P1, P2, nonID1, nonID2). Contrasts per-
formed on one half of the items yielded significant differences
between remembered and primed items (R1  P1) in bilateral
dorsal posterior parietal cortices, and between primed and non-
identified items (P1 nonID1) in bilateral ventral posterior pa-
rietal cortices (see supplemental Table 2, available at www.
jneurosci.org as supplemental material).
The four regions derived from these contrasts were used as
ROIs, extracting mean activation estimates (eigenvalues) from
the two DM contrasts (R2 P2, and P2 nonID2) using Easy-
ROI (http://www.sbirc.ed.ac.uk/cyril/). Those estimates were
then entered into a 2-by-2 ANOVAwith the factors REGIONand
CONTRAST, with left and right hemisphere analyzed sepa-
rately (Fig. 2A, bar plots). This analysis revealed a significant
REGION  CONTRAST interaction in both hemispheres (left:
F(2,38) 44.91, p 0.05; right: F(2,38) 36.90, p 0.05). Post hoc
t tests showed that in bilateral dorsal PPC, the difference between
later R and P items was significantly larger than the difference
between P and nonID items (left: t(19)  2.70, p  0.05; right:
t(19)  1.86, p  0.05), whereas in bilateral ventral PPC, the
difference between P and nonID items was significantly larger
than the difference between R and P items (left: t(19) 4.81, p
0.05; right: t(19) 4.45, p 0.05).
Interestingly, the hippocampal complex, including the hip-
pocampus proper and parahippocampal cortex, showed both
kinds of DM effects (Fig. 2B; Tables 2, 3). Post hoc, descriptive
ROI analyses, extracting activation estimates (eigenvalues) for all
three item types (R, P, and nonID) compared with the fixation
baseline, revealed that the two neighboringMTL regions showed
different patterns, with one cluster (peak located at 36 20
15, hippocampus) showing an increase (or rather a reduced
decrease) that was specific for R items (Fig. 2B, green line), and
the other one (peak located at33369, comprising parts of
parahippocampal BA 37 and the hippocampus) showing a linear
activation decrease from R to P to nonID items (Fig. 2B, blue
line).
In examining DM effects for later recognition memory, the
contrast P  R did not yield significant activations, which may
appear surprising in view of the reverse recognition DM effects
reported in previous research. However, it is, first, important to
note that the PR comparison in the current study is not equiv-
Table 3. Regions showing DM effects for perceptual identification priming (shown in blue in Fig. 2), that is, significantly more activation ( p< 0.001 uncorrected, cluster
size>5 voxels) during the encoding of P than nonID items
Hemisphere Anatomical label x y z BA T Size
B Precuneus 12 60 21 31 9.89 662
Precuneus 12 57 24 31 6.09
Precuneus 9 54 33 31 5.45
R Inferior parietal lobule 57 48 36 40 9.46 520
Middle temporal gyrus 45 66 27 39 8.79
Middle temporal gyrus 51 60 24 39 7.16
L Superior occipital gyrus 42 78 36 19 8.34 520
Superior temporal gyrus 54 63 27 39 8.06
Middle temporal gyrus 54 69 30 39 7.42
L Parahippocampal gyrus 33 36 9 37 6.57 55
Hippocampus 30 21 15 — 5.40
L Middle frontal gyrus 42 12 45 6 6.31 94
R Inferior temporal gyrus 60 18 15 20 5.89 150
Inferior temporal gyrus 63 12 21 20 5.33
Middle temporal gyrus 69 33 6 21 4.88
L Inferior temporal gyrus 60 18 15 20 5.86 170
Fusiform gyrus 60 12 27 20 4.78
Middle temporal gyrus 54 3 21 21 4.74
R Posterior cingulate 21 54 18 30 5.55 52
R Insula 45 15 3 13 5.00 61
Precentral gyrus 54 6 6 6 4.51
R Middle frontal gyrus 24 21 48 8 4.65 41
L Superior temporal gyrus 45 18 3 22 4.60 12
R Anterior cingulate 3 30 0 32 4.53 12
R Postcentral gyrus 39 18 45 4 4.49 21
Superior frontal gyrus 33 30 57 8 4.05
R Transverse temporal gyrus 48 27 12 41 4.40 30
Superior temporal gyrus 63 21 9 42 4.37
R Anterior cingulate 9 42 6 32 4.00 6
R Middle frontal gyrus 48 18 42 8 4.00 11
Precentral gyrus 36 15 36 9 3.71
L Superior frontal gyrus 21 54 9 10 3.95 9
R Hippocampus 27 18 18 — 3.90 8
Rowswithentries forhemisphereandsize refer topeakactivations inacluster. L, Left hemisphere; R, right hemisphere; B, bilateral; BA, approximateBrodmannarea labeled according to the TalairachDaemon; size, cluster size in voxels (333mm).
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alent to the reverse recognition DM effect (nonrecognized 
recognized) as calculated in previous DM studies (see Materials
and Methods). Calculating the reverse recognition DM effect in
the traditional way would have required our nonID items to be
presented in intact form for a recognition judgment, whereas
nonID items did not receive a recognition judgment. Second, the
data from the P  nonID contrast, which show activations for
later perceptual priming in areas that have previously shown re-
verse recognition DM effects (see Introduction and Discussion),
raise the possibility that, in traditional recognition DM studies,
the unrecognized item category may contain more perceptually
primed items than does the recognized item category, so that the
unrecognized  recognized contrast may reveal activations re-
lated to later perceptual priming. Here, by contrast, we “condi-
tionalize” on perceptual priming for both R and P items, so that
the P  R contrast might not be expected to yield significant
activations. Consistent with this assertion, the R  nonID con-
trast showed activations in similar areas reported for the P 
nonID contrast, with the activations in both of these contrasts
actually consisting of reduced deactivations compared to the fix-
ation baseline (data not shown), as is often observed in relation to
the so-called default network (see Discussion).
Additional behavioral data
The finding that MTL activation predicts later perceptual prim-
ing is somewhat counterintuitive given the widely assumed selec-
tive role of the hippocampus in encoding for later conscious
episodic recollection (e.g., Schott et al., 2006). One valid concern
with respect to these data, as well as the other activations predict-
ing later perceptual priming, is that the P (primed) item category
might have been subject to contamination by familiarity or by
low-confidence recognition memory, which might have hap-
pened if participants answered “studied” only if they specifically
recollected the study episode, or answered “studied” only if they
were very sure that an item was studied. Indeed, according to a
signal-detection analysis (e.g., Yonelinas, 1999), within correctly
identified items, participants in the fMRI experiment were some-
what more conservative than neutral in responding “studied,”
because their criterion measure of 0.67 [criterion0.5(zhit rate
zfalse alarm rate)] was larger than zero, with zero corresponding to a
completely neutral response criterion.
The additional behavioral experiment provided important in-
formation in this regard (see Table 1). In the replication of the
fMRI procedure (OLD/NEW condition), performance was sim-
ilar to performance in the fMRI sample, with a similar criterion
from a signal-detection analysis (0.60). In the R/K/G condition,
when participants made a “studied” response, they were permitted
to classify the items as being specifically episodically recollected
as studied (Recollect), strongly familiar in the experimental con-
text (Know), or simply guessed as studied (Guess) (see Gardiner
and Richardson-Klavehn, 2000). If familiar items or items that
could be guessed as studied were contained in the P category (i.e.,
items judged nonstudied) in the fMRI experiment and the OLD/
NEW condition, the R/K/G test instructions should shift such
items into the R category, resulting in lower percentage of P items
in the R/K/G condition compared with the fMRI experiment and
the OLD/NEW condition. As shown in Table 1, however, the
estimated percentage of P items did not substantially change,
suggesting that the vast majority of the P items in the fMRI ex-
periment and the OLD/NEW condition were truly nonrecog-
nized (see also Richardson-Klavehn et al., 1994a, for convergent
evidence). Furthermore (supplemental Table 3, available at www.
jneurosci.org as supplemental material), a relatively low percent-
age of the “studied” responses to studied words in the R/K/G
condition were based on specific episodic recollection, and a rel-
atively high percentage were based on familiarity, as would be
expected given the “shallow” syllable counting task used at study
(see Gardiner and Richardson-Klavehn, 2000). There were also
some items simply guessed as studied, with the Guess responses
not discriminating between studied and nonstudied items, as is
typically found (see Gardiner and Richardson-Klavehn, 2000).
These results further encourage the conclusion that the P item
category in the fMRI experiment and the OLD/NEW condition
was substantially composed of items truly nonrecognized as
studied.
Adopting a signal-detection approach (Yonelinas, 1999), as
represented by the CONF (confidence judgment) condition in
the behavioral experiment, provided further evidence for this
conclusion (supplemental Table 4, available at www.jneurosci.
org as supplemental material). Classifying items judged as very
sure studied, sure studied, and tendentially studied (C1–C3) as R
items, and items judged tendentially nonstudied, sure nonstud-
ied, and very sure nonstudied (C4–C6) as P items, corresponding
to a neutral response criterion, resulted in reasonably accurate
estimates of the percentages of these items in the fMRI experi-
ment and the OLD/NEW condition (Table 1).
Moreover, classifying items eliciting familiarity (Know re-
sponses in the R/K/G condition) or low-confidence “studied”
judgments (C3 responses in the CONF condition) as P items,
rather than R items, resulted in statistically significant overesti-
mates of the percentage of P items in the OLD/NEW condition,
and by implication, in the fMRI experiment (see supplemental
Results). In sum, the results suggest that very few of the P items
were “contaminated” with familiarity or low-confidence recog-
nition memory. Perceptual fluency, as assessed by perceptual
identification priming, is frequently asserted to contribute to
feelings of familiarity or to low-confidence recognition memory
(for discussion, see Conroy et al., 2005). However, the data from
the current P items are more consistent with other findings sug-
gesting that perceptual priming can occur without any awareness
at all of a prior study episode [e.g., Richardson-Klavehn et al.
(1994a), Paller et al. (2003), Conroy et al. (2005), and Schott et al.
(2005, 2006)].
Discussion
Two distinct frontoparietal cortical networks predicted later in-
cidental perceptual identification priming and later intentional
recognition memory (Fig. 2A). Activation in dorsal posterior
parietal regions predicted later recognition memory, replicating
prior studies (Uncapher and Wagner, 2009), whereas activation
in ventral posterior parietal cortex predicted later perceptual
identification priming.Moreover, activity in prefrontal areas was
also differentially related to later memory, with ventrolateral ar-
eas showing the typical positive recognition DM effect, and dor-
solateral andmedial frontal areas showing positiveDMeffects for
perceptual priming.
Positive DM effects in the posterior parietal lobe are typically
found in the dorsal portion, comprising the intraparietal sulcus
and adjacent superior parietal lobule (Uncapher and Wagner,
2009). In line with a dual-attention view (Corbetta and Shulman,
2002; Cabeza, 2008; Cabeza et al., 2008; Ciaramelli et al., 2008),
dorsal activations have been taken as reflecting goal-directed at-
tention that supports the formation of episodic memories, as
assessed in intentional recognition tests, because it focuses atten-
tional resources on processing the conceptual aspects of an item
(Cabeza et al., 2008; Uncapher and Wagner, 2009). The present
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results confirm this assumption, in that the parietal correlates of
encoding for later recognition memory were located around the
intraparietal sulcus, which is part of the dorsal attentional system
(Corbetta and Shulman, 2002).
However, we expand these prior findings by demonstrating
that activity of the ventral parietal cortex, in the vicinity of the
supramarginal gyrus, is strongly predictive of later perceptual
identification priming. This finding is remarkable, given that ex-
actly the same region has revealed negative DM effects, that is,
relatively more activation for later forgotten than remembered
items (Otten andRugg, 2001a; Daselaar et al., 2004; Shrager et al.,
2008; Uncapher and Wagner, 2009). The finding that activity in
this region predicts successful later identification priming there-
fore helps to elucidate the encoding processes supported by ven-
tral posterior parietal cortex. It has been speculated, again based
on the dual-attention view (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002), that
ventral parietal activation reflects attentional capture by salient,
superficial item features (Uncapher andWagner, 2009). We pro-
vide direct empirical evidence for this idea, suggesting that ven-
tral parietal activation reflects a shift of selective attention from
goal-directed conceptual to stimulus-driven perceptual process-
ing (e.g., focusing attention on visual attributes of an item). Such
orienting of selective attention is known to be beneficial for later
incidental perceptual priming, but detrimental for intentional
recognition memory (Jacoby, 1983; Richardson-Klavehn et al.,
1994b), although in some cases, encoding perceptual stimulus
features might also facilitate later recognition memory [e.g.,
when items are perceptually distinct (see Uncapher andWagner,
2009)].
Prefrontal correlates of successful memory formation are typ-
ically located on inferior, and sometimes middle, frontal gyri
(Blumenfeld and Ranganath, 2007; Spaniol et al., 2009). Our re-
sults confirm that activation in ventrolateral prefrontal areas is
primarily associated with later intentional recognition memory,
as revealed by the contrast of later-remembered versus primed
items.On the other hand, later perceptual identification priming,
but not recognition memory, was predicted by superior frontal
activation, in an area that has also been associated with reverse
DM effects (Otten and Rugg, 2001a; Clark and Wagner, 2003;
Daselaar et al., 2004). Some authors have argued that this region
supports the organization of the to-be-encoded material into
“chunks” that are more easily remembered, provided that the later
test emphasizes relations between successive items, or between item
and context (Staresina andDavachi, 2006; Summerfield et al., 2006;
Blumenfeld andRanganath, 2007).Our findings suggest that dorso-
lateral prefrontal cortex may also support much lower-level encod-
ing processes that set the stage for later perceptual priming.
Attentional binding is one such prerequisite for priming (Hayman
and Jacoby, 1989; Schacter et al., 1991; Richardson-Klavehn and
Gardiner, 1998), andcouldbeachievedvia the strongconnectionsof
this area with the ventral posterior parietal lobe (Petrides and
Pandya, 1999; Petrides, 2005; Umarova et al., 2010). Support
for a binding function of the superior PFC comes from an
fMRI investigation showing that connectivity between this
same area and modality-specific late visual areas predicts suc-
cessful associative recognition (Summerfield et al., 2006).
Three further aspects of the present data deserve mention.
First, a recent meta-analysis concluded that lateral parietal DM
effects are independent of the test used to assessmemory (Uncapher
and Wagner, 2009), and differential DM effects due to different
testing procedures have indeed been localizedmainly to prefron-
tal andmedial temporal regions (Ranganath et al., 2004; Staresina
and Davachi, 2006; Summerfield et al., 2006). However, all these
studies used different intentional memory tests, whichmight not
be sensitive to differential parietal contributions, because perfor-
mance in these tests generally benefits from conceptual process-
ing at encoding. We are aware of only one prior study that
reported distinct encoding correlates of later priming and recog-
nition memory (Schott et al., 2006), which used a word stem
completion task and found a parietal pattern suggestive of the
very distinctive pattern we found in the present experiment.
Second, our study design comprised a passive fixation baseline
for assessing encoding-related increases and decreases. Our data
suggest that the neural correlates of successful encoding for later
recognition memory were primarily driven by task related
increases, whereas the neural correlates of encoding for later per-
ceptual identification priming were primarily driven by task-
related decreases. The network of brain regions predicting later
perceptual identification priming (Fig. 2A, blue) is strikingly
reminiscent of the so called default network (Shulman et al.,
1997; Raichle et al., 2001) including ventrolateral and medial
parietal lobe, hippocampus, and anterior cingulate. Shulman et
al. (1997) suggested that this network is mainly concerned with
sensory monitoring, and is suppressed during demanding cogni-
tive tasks. Along these lines, it has been argued that default net-
work activity reflects a stimulus-driven mode of attention
(Gilbert et al., 2007; Hahn et al., 2007), which, from a memory
viewpoint, would favor later perceptual identification, but not
recognition memory (Jacoby, 1983; Richardson-Klavehn et al.,
1994b). This argument is consistent with the finding that default
network activity sometimes predicts encoding failures if memory
is assessed by intentional-conceptual recall or recognition tests
(Otten and Rugg, 2001a; Daselaar et al., 2004; Shrager et al.,
2008).
Third, we also found hippocampal DM effects. Whereas a
smaller area showed the expected pattern (Spaniol et al., 2009) of
more activation during the encoding of later recognized than
primed words (Fig. 2B, green), we were surprised to find a larger,
neighboring area that was predictive of later perceptual identifi-
cation priming, and showed a trend toward a recognition DM
effect (Fig. 2B, blue; Table 3). The latter finding underscores
claims that information processing in the hippocampal complex
might not be restricted to the episodicmemory domain (Ranganath
and D’Esposito, 2001; Moscovitch, 2008; Kumaran and Maguire,
2009). There have been speculations about (Ostergaard and
Jernigan, 1993; Moscovitch, 2008), as well as findings of (Schott et
al., 2005;Hannulah andRanganath, 2009;Voss et al., 2009), a role of
the medial temporal lobe in priming, although until now they have
mainly concerned retrieval rather than encoding (but seeHannulah
and Ranganath, 2009). A hippocampal role for the formation of
perceptual memories is thus not inconceivable, and should be fur-
ther explored.
Some incidental tests are sensitive to prior conceptual pro-
cessing (Blaxton, 1989), and some intentional tests are sensitive
to prior perceptual processing (Whittlesea and Williams, 2000;
Holdstock et al., 2002; Voss et al., 2008). However, our claim that
encoding processes leading to successful incidental perceptual
identification priming are primarily perceptual, and that encod-
ing processes leading to successful intentional recognition mem-
ory are primarily conceptual, is strongly underpinned by studies
using the same memory measures. Incidental perceptual identi-
fication priming is greater following perceptual than conceptual
encoding, with the same encoding conditions producing the re-
verse effect on intentional recognition memory (crossed double
dissociations) [e.g., Jacoby (1983) and Richardson-Klavehn et al.
(1994b)] [for review, see Roediger and McDermott (1993) and
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Richardson-Klavehn et al. (2009)]. Future research will show
whether the neural pattern found here can be reproduced using
conceptual and perceptual encoding manipulations to experi-
mentally examine the neural correlates of transfer-appropriate
processing (Morris et al., 1977).
To summarize, we combined an incidental perceptual identi-
fication testwith an intentional recognition test,which allowedus to
uniquely classify encoding trials as later remembered, primed, and
nonidentified (Schott et al., 2005, 2006; Voss and Paller, 2008). We
found that at encoding, later recognition memory was positively
predicted by activation in dorsal posterior parietal and ventrolateral
prefrontal areas previously associated with encoding success and
with conceptually driven processing at encoding (Otten et al., 2002;
Blumenfeld andRanganath, 2007;Uncapher andWagner, 2009). By
contrast, activity in brain regions previously associated with encod-
ing failure rather than success (Clark andWagner, 2003; Daselaar et
al., 2004; Blumenfeld andRanganath, 2007; Shrager et al., 2008;Un-
capher and Wagner, 2009) positively predicted perceptual identifi-
cation priming. Our results suggest that reverse DM effects may
reflect stimulus-driven attentional orienting at encoding, which is
unfavorable for later recognition memory, but facilitates later per-
ceptual identification.
References
Blaxton TA (1989) Investigating dissociations among memory measures:
support for a transfer-appropriate processing framework. J Exp Psychol
Learn Mem Cogn 15:657–668.
Blumenfeld RS, Ranganath C (2007) Prefrontal cortex and long-termmem-
ory encoding: an integrative review of findings from neuropsychology
and neuroimaging. Neuroscientist 13:280–291.
Cabeza R (2008) Role of parietal regions in episodic memory retrieval: the
dual attention processes hypothesis. Neuropsychologia 46:1813–1827.
Cabeza R, Ciaramelli E, Olson IR, MoscovitchM (2008) The parietal cortex
and episodic memory: an attentional account. Nat Rev Neurosci
9:613–625.
Ciaramelli E, Grady CL, Moscovitch M (2008) Top-down and bottom-up
attention to memory: a hypothesis (AtoM) on the role of the posterior
parietal cortex in memory retrieval. Neuropsychologia 46:1828–1851.
Clark D, Wagner AD (2003) Assembling and encoding word representa-
tions: fMRI subsequent memory effects implicate a role for phonological
control. Neuropsychologia 41:304–317.
ConroyMA,Hopkins RO, Squire LR (2005) On the contribution of percep-
tual fluency and priming to recognition memory. Cogn Affect Behav
Neurosci 5:14–20.
Corbetta M, Shulman GL (2002) Control of goal-directed and stimulus-
driven attention in the brain. Nat Rev Neurosci 3:201–215.
Daselaar SM, Prince SE, Cabeza R (2004) When less means more: deactiva-
tions during encoding that predict subsequent memory. Neuroimage
23:921–927.
Friston KJ, Holmes AP, Worsley KJ, Poline JP, Frith CD, Frackowiak RSJ
(1994) Statistical parametricmaps in functional imaging: a general linear
approach. Hum Brain Mapp 2:189–210.
Gardiner JM, Richardson-Klavehn A (2000) Remembering and knowing.
In: The Oxford handbook of memory (Tulving E, Craik FIM, eds), pp
229–244. New York: Oxford UP.
Gilbert SJ, Dumontheil I, Simons JS, Frith CD, Burgess PW (2007) Com-
ment on “Wandering minds: the default network and stimulus-
independent thought.” Science 317:43.
Hahn B, Ross TJ, Stein EA (2007) Cingulate activation increases dynami-
cally with response speed under stimulus unpredictability. Cereb Cortex
17:1664–1671.
Hannula DE, Ranganath C (2009) The eyes have it: hippocampal activity
predicts expression of memory in eye movements. Neuron 63:592–599.
Hayman CA, Jacoby LL (1989) Specific word transfer as a measure of pro-
cessing in the word-superiority paradigm. Mem Cognit 17:125–133.
Holdstock JS, Mayes AR, Roberts N, Cezayirli E, Isaac CL, O’Reilly RC, Nor-
man KA (2002) Under what conditions is recognition spared relative to
recall after selective hippocampal damage in humans? Hippocampus
12:341–351.
Jacoby LL (1983) Remembering the data: analyzing interactive processes in
reading. J Verb Learn Verb Behav 22:485–508.
Kumaran D, Maguire EA (2009) Novelty signals: a window into hippocam-
pal information processing. Trends Cogn Sci 13:47–54.
Morris CD, Bransford JD, Franks JJ (1977) Levels of processing versus
transfer appropriate processing. J Verb Learn Verb Behav 16:389–395.
Moscovich M (2008) The hippocampus as a “stupid”, domain-specific mod-
ule: implications for theories of recent and remote memory, and of imag-
ination. Can J Exp Psychol 62:62–79.
Ostergaard AL, Jernigan TL (1993) Are word priming and explicit memory
mediated by different brain structures? In: Implicit memory: New direc-
tions in cognition, development, and neuropsychology (Masson MEJ,
Graf P, eds), pp 327–350. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Otten LJ, Rugg MD (2001a) When more means less: neural activity related
to unsuccessful memory encoding. Curr Biol 11:1528–1530.
Otten LJ, Rugg MD (2001b) Task-dependency of the neural correlates of
episodic encoding as measured by fMRI. Cereb Cortex 11:1150–1160.
Otten LJ, Henson RN, RuggMD (2001) Depth of processing on neural cor-
relates of memory encoding: relationship between findings from across-
and within-task comparisons. Brain 124:399–412.
Otten LJ, Henson RN, RuggMD (2002) State-related and item-related neu-
ral correlates of successfulmemory encoding. NatNeurosci 5:1339–1344.
Paller KA, Kutas M, Mayes AR (1987) Neural correlates of encoding in an
incidental learning paradigm. Electroencephalogr Clin Neurophysiol
67:360–371.
Paller KA, Hutson CA, Miller BB, Boehm SG (2003) Neural manifestations
of memory with and without awareness. Neuron 38:507–516.
Petrides M (2005) Lateral prefrontal cortex: architectonic and functional
organization. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 360:781–795.
Petrides M, Pandya DN (1999) Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex: comparative
cytoarchitectonic analysis in the human and the macaque brain and cor-
ticocortical connection patterns. Eur J Neurosci 11:1011–1036.
Raichle ME, MacLeod AM, Snyder AZ, Powers WJ, Gusnard DA, Shulman
GL (2001) A default mode of brain function. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A
98:676–682.
RanganathC,D’EspositoM (2001) Medial temporal lobe activity associated
with active maintenance of novel information. Neuron 31:865–873.
Ranganath C, Yonelinas AP, Cohen MX, Dy CJ, Tom SM, D’Esposito M
(2004) Dissociable correlates of recollection and familiarity within the
medial temporal lobes. Neuropsychologia 42:2–13.
Richardson-Klavehn A, Gardiner JM (1998) Depth-of-processing effects on
priming in word-stem completion: tests of the voluntary-contamination,
lexical-processing, and conceptual-processing hypotheses. J Exp Psychol
Learn Mem Cogn 24:593–609.
Richardson-Klavehn A, Gardiner JM, Java RI (1994a) Involuntary con-
scious memory and the method of opposition. Memory 2:1–29.
Richardson-Klavehn A, Lee MG, Joubran R, Bjork RA (1994b) Intention
and awareness in perceptual identification priming. Mem Cognit
22:293–312.
Richardson-Klavehn A, Bergstro¨m ZM,Magno E, Markopoulos G, Sweeney-
ReedCM,WimberM (2009) On the intimate relationship between neu-
robiology and function in the theoretical analysis of human learning and
memory. In: Neuroimaging of human memory: linking cognitive pro-
cesses to neural systems (Ro¨sler F, RanganathC, Ro¨der B, KluweRH, eds),
pp 127–165. New York: Oxford UP.
Roediger HL, McDermott KB (1993) Implicit memory in normal human
subjects. In: Handbook of neuropsychology (Boller F, Grafman J, eds), pp
63–131. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
SchacterDL,Cooper LA,Delaney SM,PetersonMA,TharanM (1991) Implicit
memory for possible and impossible objects: constraints on the construction
of structural descriptions. J Exp Psychol LearnMemCogn 17:3–19.
Schott BH, Henson RN, Richardson-Klavehn A, Becker C, Thoma V, Heinze
HJ, Du¨zel E (2005) Redefining implicit and explicit memory: the func-
tional neuroanatomy of priming, remembering, and control of retrieval.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 102:1257–1262.
Schott BH, Richardson-Klavehn A, Henson RN, Becker C, Heinze HJ, Du¨zel
E (2006) Neuroanatomical dissociation of encoding processes related to
priming and explicit memory. J Neurosci 26:792–800.
Shrager Y, Kirwan CB, Squire LR (2008) Activity in both hippocampus and
perirhinal cortex predicts the memory strength of subsequently remem-
bered information. Neuron 59:547–553.
Shulman GL, Corbetta M, Buckner RL, Raichle ME, Fiez JA, Miezin FM,
Wimber et al. • Perceptual versus Conceptual Encoding J. Neurosci., October 6, 2010 • 30(40):13272–13280 • 13279
Petersen SE (1997) Top-down modulation of early sensory cortex.
Cereb Cortex 7:193–206.
Spaniol J, Davidson PS, Kim AS, Han H, Moscovitch M, Grady CL (2009)
Event-related fMRI studies of episodic encoding and retrieval:meta-analyses
using activation likelihood estimation. Neuropsychologia 47:1765–1779.
Staresina BP, Davachi L (2006) Differential encoding mechanisms for sub-
sequent associative recognition and free recall. J Neurosci 26:9162–9172.
Summerfield C, GreeneM,Wager T, Egner T, Hirsch J,Mangels J (2006) Neo-
cortical connectivity during episodic memory formation. PLoS Biol 4:e128.
Umarova RM, Saur D, Schnell S, Kaller CP, Vry MS, Glauche V, Rijntjes M,
Hennig J, Kiselev V,Weiller C (2010) Structural connectivity for visuospa-
tial attention: significance of ventral pathways. Cereb Cortex 20:121–129.
Uncapher MR, Wagner AD (2009) Posterior parietal cortex and episodic
encoding: insights from fMRI subsequent memory effects and dual-
attention theory. Neurobiol Learn Mem 91:139–154.
Voss JL, Paller KA (2008) Brain substrates of implicit and explicit memory:
the importance of concurrently acquired neural signals of both memory
types. Neuropsychologia 46:3021–3029.
Voss JL, Baym CL, Paller KA (2008) Accurate forced-choice recognition
without awareness of memory retrieval. Learn Mem 15:454–459.
Voss JL, Hauner KK, Paller KA (2009) Establishing a relationship between
activity reduction in human perirhinal cortex and priming. Hippocam-
pus 19:773–778.
Whittlesea BW,Williams LD (2000) The source of feelings of familiarity: the
discrepancy-attribution hypothesis. J Exp Psychol Learn Mem Cogn
26:547–565.
Yonelinas AP (1999) The contribution of recollection and familiarity to rec-
ognition and source-memory judgments: a formal dual-process model
and an analysis of receiver operating characteristics. J Exp Psychol Learn
Mem Cogn 25:1415–1434.
13280 • J. Neurosci., October 6, 2010 • 30(40):13272–13280 Wimber et al. • Perceptual versus Conceptual Encoding
